MATHIAS, Judge.
Victor Ponce ("Ponce") appeals the Elkhart Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that the court erred in rejecting Ponce's claim that he was not properly advised of his constitutional rights before pleading guilty and that he therefore did not knowingly and voluntarily waive these rights. Concluding that the postconviction court could have properly concluded that Ponce did not present evidence sufficient to support his claims, we affirm.
On March 31, 1999, the State charged Ponce with two counts of Class A felony dealing in cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school. On September 9, 1999, Ponce entered into a plea agreement with the State.
The written plea agreement, which was signed by Ponce and his counsel, stated in part:
Appellant's App. p. 181.
The trial court held a guilty plea hearing on September 9, at which the court used
The trial court then orally advised Ponce of his Boykin rights: the right against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the right to confront witnesses. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (holding that a guilty plea is invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment unless the defendant knew or was told that he was giving up the right against self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront his accusers). Castillo relayed these advisements to Ponce in Spanish.
On October 29, 2009, Ponce filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. After counsel was appointed to represent Ponce, he filed an amended petition for postconviction relief on October 17, 2011. The post-conviction court held a hearing on this petition on May 15, 2012. At the postconviction hearing, Ponce presented evidence from Christina Courtright ("Courtright"), an interpreter certified by the Indiana Supreme Court. Courtright had listened to the audio recording of Ponce's guilty plea hearing and compared what the trial court stated in English to what Castillo had told Ponce in Spanish. In so doing, Courtright found several translation errors. Courtright prepared a chart, which was admitted into evidence at the hearing, which outlined what was said in English, what Castillo told Ponce, and what Courtright determined was a more accurate translation of what the trial court had said. Courtright testified that Castillo had translated certain legal terms inaccurately and that each of the three Boykin advisements had been mistranslated. The trial court took the matter under advisement, and directed the parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
On August 1, 2012, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law denying Ponce's petition, which provided in relevant part:
Appellant's App. pp. 159-161. Ponce now appeals.
Post-conviction proceedings are not "super appeals" through which convicted persons can raise issues they failed to raise at trial or on direct appeal. McCary v. State, 761 N.E.2d 389, 391 (Ind.2002). Post-conviction proceedings instead afford petitioners a limited opportunity to raise issues that were unavailable or unknown at trial and on direct appeal. Davidson v. State, 763 N.E.2d 441, 443 (Ind.2002). A post-conviction petitioner bears the burden of establishing grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Henley v. State, 881 N.E.2d 639, 643 (Ind.2008). On appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, the petitioner stands in the position of one appealing from a negative judgment. Id. Thus, to prevail on appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, the petitioner must show that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction court. Id. at 643-44.
Where, as here, the post-conviction court makes findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(6), we cannot affirm the judgment on any legal basis but instead must determine if the court's findings are sufficient to support its judgment. Graham v. State, 941 N.E.2d 1091, 1096 (Ind.Ct.App.2011), aff'd on reh'g, 947 N.E.2d 962. Although we do not defer to the post-conviction court's legal conclusions, we review the post-conviction court's factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard. Id. Accordingly, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses, and we will consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences flowing therefrom that support the post-conviction court's decision. Id.
In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), the United States Supreme Court held that it was reversible error for a trial judge to accept a guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary. Boykin requires that the record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that the defendant was informed of and waived three specific federal constitutional rights: the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one's accusers. Id. at 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709; accord Hall v. State, 849 N.E.2d 466, 469 (Ind.2006).
Here, Ponce presented evidence at the post-conviction hearing that Castillo's Spanish translation of the trial court's proper English language Boykin advisement was defective. According to Ponce's witness Courtright, when the trial court advised Ponce, "you have the right to a public and speedy trial by jury," Castillo translated this into Spanish as, "He's — he's advising you that you have the right to another — another judging [unintelligible] speedier." Ex. Vol. Defendant's Ex. G, p. 7. When the trial court told Ponce in English, "You also have the right to face all witnesses against you and to see, hear, question, and cross-examine these witnesses," Castillo told Ponce in Spanish, "And you also have the right to see those who have the witnesses and ... to ask if it's all right [unintelligible]." Id. at 8. When the trial court explained to Ponce in English, "You also have the right to require witnesses to be present at any hearing or trial and to testify in your behalf," Castillo told Ponce in Spanish, "And you can also require witnesses to come for your case so that, in case you have some... to help you." Id. And when the trial court advised Ponce in English, "Further, you cannot be compelled to make any statement or testify against yourself at any hearing or trial ... but you may remain silent," Castillo translated this into Spanish as, "And until that date you cannot make other oaths against yourself ... but you can remain silent." Id.
The post-conviction court did not cast doubt on the accuracy of Courtright's testimony. Instead, the post-conviction court properly observed that, even if Ponce was not properly advised in Spanish of his Boykin rights, the conviction need not be vacated if Ponce nevertheless knew at the time of his plea that he was waiving his Boykin rights. See Dewitt, 755 N.E.2d at 171. The post-conviction court also noted that Ponce had indicated to the trial court that he did, in fact, understand English and could even speak "a little" English. Moreover, Ponce never testified at the post-conviction hearing; thus, there was no evidence to counter Ponce's earlier statement that he understood English, and it is uncontroverted that the trial court's Boykin advisement in English was accurate.
We reiterate that Ponce faces a substantial burden on appeal from the denial of his post-conviction petition. See Henley, 881 N.E.2d at 643-44. Considering only the evidence favorable to the post-conviction court's decision, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, we cannot say that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the postconviction court. Accordingly, we must affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.
Affirmed.
KIRSCH, J., and CRONE, J., concur.
I.C. § 35-35-1-2(a)(2).